IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-09-00093.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Delacote

    () (INRA AgroParisTech, LEF)

Abstract

Consumer boycotts and international economic sanctions represent a frequent tool to protest against countries for their violation of human rights. This paper questions if such a kind of action hurts more the populations it is supposed to defend than governing classes it is targeting. Overall, boycotts of more rapacious regimes may decrease more the well-being of the population than the one of the governing class.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Delacote, 2009. "Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1856-1862.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00093
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I3-P34.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Edmonds, 2007. "Child Labor," Working Papers id:988, eSocialSciences.
    2. Edmonds, Eric V., 2008. "Child Labor," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
    3. Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2007. "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
    4. Basu, Kaushik & Zarghamee, Homa, 2009. "Is product boycott a good idea for controlling child labor? A theoretical investigation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 217-220.
    5. Sen, Amartya, 1979. "The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1-45.
    6. Sen, Amartya, 1980. "The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Reply," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1547-1552.
    7. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg & William Mertens, 2004. "International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 29-51, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumer boycott; dictatorial regimes.;

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00093. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.