A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing
This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives d by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research.
Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): 29 ()
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- Ross Guest, 2001. "The Instructor's Optimal Mix of Teaching Methods," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 313-326.
- Deborah Wilson & Bronwyn Croxson & Adele Atkinson, 2004. "“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/107, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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"Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
05/128, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Randall Reback, 2006.
"Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement,"
0602, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
- Reback, Randall, 2008. "Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1394-1415, June.
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