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Size and distribution of prizes and efforts in contests

Author

Listed:
  • Gil S. Epstein

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Shmuel Nitzan

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

The intensity of competition in contests is affected by the sum of the awarded prizes and by the prize distribution among the contestants. The current paper examines which of these two parameters has a larger effect on the players' extent of participation in the contest.

Suggested Citation

  • Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Size and distribution of prizes and efforts in contests," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(10), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04h00002
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume8/EB-04H00002A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-739, September.
    2. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
    3. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 661-677, October.
    5. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
    6. Tore Ellingsen, 2008. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 399-408, Springer.
    7. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Effort and Performance in Public Policy Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 265-282, May.
    8. Hurley, Terrance M, 1998. "Rent Dissipation and Efficiency in a Contest with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 289-298, March.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Epstein Gil S. & Lindner Pomerantz Renana, 2011. "Media and Litigation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 539-571, December.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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