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Endogenous Public Policy, Politicization and Welfare

  • Gil S . Epstein
  • Shmuel Nitzan

In the two-stage political-economic game that we study public policy is the outcome of the interaction between interest groups and a two-tier government. Implementation of a policy proposed by a bureaucrat requires approval by an elected politician. The objective function of the bureaucrat hinges on the weight assigned to social welfare relative to the rent-seeking outlays of the interest groups. This weight represents the degree of politicization of the government. Our main result is that, in contrast to common belief, increased politicization need not adversely affect the public well-being. Copyright Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2002.

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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 661-677

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:4:p:661-677
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