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Media and Litigation

Listed author(s):
  • Epstein Gil S.

    (Bar-Ilan University, IZA Bonn and CReAM London; Bar-Ilan University)

  • Lindner Pomerantz Renana

    (Bar-Ilan University, IZA Bonn and CReAM London; Bar-Ilan University)

In this paper we consider the relationship between the media and the outcome of civil litigation. We present a model dividing lawsuits into two main stages: a signaling stage and a rent-seeking contest. During the first stage the judge is exposed to signals regarding the true position of the defendant, and in addition pays attention to signals reported by the media. The judge forms an initial prejudice towards the plaintiff and the defendant based on the ratio between the true merit of the case and the burden of proof required to establish the plaintiffs claim (the preponderance of the evidence). Then, we turn to the second stage and provide the plaintiff and the defendant with an opportunity to invest resources in order to influence their winning probabilities. We show how the media can influence the process with biased reports.

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File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2011.7.issue-2/1555-5879.1521/1555-5879.1521.xml?format=INT
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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 539-571

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:7:y:2011:i:2:n:8
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  1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
  2. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
  3. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "Size and distribution of prizes and efforts in contests," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(10), pages 1-10.
  4. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, 03.
  5. Max Schanzenbach, 2005. "Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 57-92, 01.
  6. Besley, Timothy & Burgess, Robin, 2001. "Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 629-640, May.
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