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Nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good

Author

Listed:
  • Khaïreddine Jebsi

    (LEGI, Ecole Polytechnique, La Marsa and Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques et Politiques de Sousse, Tunisia)

  • Lionel Thomas

    (CRESE, Université de Franche Comté, IUT Besançon Vesoul, Besançon, France)

Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good. In contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result in the standard screening model, we show that the presence of a delay cost borne by users leads to upward distortions in consumption for the high-demand users.

Suggested Citation

  • Khaïreddine Jebsi & Lionel Thomas, 2005. "Nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04d80013
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sundararajan, Arun, 2004. "Nonlinear pricing and type-dependent network effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 107-113, April.
    2. Jebsi, Khaireddine & Thomas, Lionel, 2004. "Optimal pricing for selling a congestible good with countervailing incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 251-256, May.
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    4. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
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    7. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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