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Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    () (CREPP Université de Liège and CORE)

  • Pierre Pestieau

    () (CREPP Université de Liège, CORE, DELTA and CEPR)

  • Jon Hamilton

    () (Department of Economics, University of Florida)

Abstract

This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau & Jon Hamilton, 2002. "Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(2), pages 1-6.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02h20003
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gwenael Piaser, 2003. "Labor Mobility and Income Tax Competition," Public Economics 0302002, EconWPA.
    2. David E. Wildasin, 1994. "Income Redistribution and Migration," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-656, August.
    3. Gahvari, Firouz, 1989. "The nature of government expenditures and the shape of the laffer curve," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 251-260, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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