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The International Law and Economics of Coercive Diplomacy: Macroeconomic Effects and Empirical Findings

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  • Christopher E.S. WARBURTON

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the actual and probable macroeconomic effects of economic sanctions (coercive diplomacy) within the framework of international law. It considers the performance of critical macroeconomic variables before and after the imposition of sanctions. The methodology of this paper incorporates risk tolerance (probabilities) in order to report probabilistic and real outcomes when targets become noncompliant. For a select number of countries with a history of exposure to sanctions, this paper finds that states that are willing to accommodate the economic risks imposed by senders are not likely to increase national income and human welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher E.S. WARBURTON, 2016. "The International Law and Economics of Coercive Diplomacy: Macroeconomic Effects and Empirical Findings," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 16(1), pages 35-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:eaa:aeinde:v:16:y:2016:i:1_4
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    File URL: http://www.usc.es/~economet/reviews/aeid1614.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
    2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2007. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (hardcover)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4075, January.
    3. Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2007. "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 27, pages 867-911, Elsevier.
    4. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Rodr'iguez, 2022. "Sanctions and Imports of Essential Goods: A Closer Look at the Equipo Anova (2021) Results," Papers 2212.09904, arXiv.org.
    2. C.E.S. WARBURTON, Ph.D., 2022. "How Currencies Crash And Die: Wars And Currency Valuation," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 22(2), pages 49-66.
    3. Rodriguez, Francisco, 2022. "Sanctions and Imports of Essential Goods; A Closer Look at the Equipo Anova (2021) Results," MPRA Paper 115714, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F17 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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