The International Law and Economics of Coercive Diplomacy: Macroeconomic Effects and Empirical Findings
This paper empirically investigates the actual and probable macroeconomic effects of economic sanctions (coercive diplomacy) within the framework of international law. It considers the performance of critical macroeconomic variables before and after the imposition of sanctions. The methodology of this paper incorporates risk tolerance (probabilities) in order to report probabilistic and real outcomes when targets become noncompliant. For a select number of countries with a history of exposure to sanctions, this paper finds that states that are willing to accommodate the economic risks imposed by senders are not likely to increase national income and human welfare.
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Volume (Year): 16 (2016)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2007. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (hardcover)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4075, January.
- Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2007. "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
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