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Anforderungen an die konsistente Regulierung der Eisenbahnen

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  • Frank Miram

Abstract

A current topic in Germany and the EU is the review of railway legislation regarding access and price regulation as well as unbundling requirements of infrastructure and transport services. The debate focuses firstly on the question whether unbundling requirements should be extended. Secondly, it discusses a possible new design of price regulation principles. Before analysing these proposals, this paper describes the specific requirements for regulation of the railway sector and its current regulation. It shows that the current regulatory system in Germany ensures non-discriminatory access and competition. The integrated structure of the DB group creates a high efficiency within the entire railway system from which also third parties benefit. In contrast to the typical natural monopoly, the railway network does not generate monopoly profits but suffers from insufficient cost recovery and, therefore, from insufficient funding. Hence, the article outlines that reforms of railway regulation should focus on safeguarding long term infrastructure investments. Extensions of regulation can only be justified as far as monopolistic bottlenecks are concerned. In Deutschland und auf europäischer Ebene wird aktuell eine Neufassung eisenbahnrechtlicher Zugangs-, Entgelt- und Entflechtungsbestimmungen erörtert. Zentraler Diskussionspunkt ist neben der Frage, ob die Entflechtung von Infrastruktur- und Verkehrsbetrieb erweitert werden sollte, vor allem eine mögliche Neubestimmung der Entgeltmaßstäbe. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschreibt die spezifischen regulatorischen Anforderungen im Eisenbahnsektor, das aktuelle Regulierungsdesign und bewertet die Vorschläge zu seiner Weiterentwicklung. Bereits heute besteht in Deutschland eine wirksame Zugangs- und Entgeltregulierung, die diskriminierungsfreien Wettbewerb ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig gewährleistet die Verbundstruktur der DB eine hohe Effizienz des Gesamtsystems Eisenbahn, von der auch Dritte profitieren. Das Schienennetz unterscheidet sich von klassischen natürlichen Monopolen, da es keine Monopolgewinne generiert, sondern ein Kostendeckungs- und damit in erster Linie ein Finanzierungsproblem hat. Im Vordergrund von Reformüberlegungen sollte deshalb die langfristige Sicherstellung von Investitionen in die Infrastruktur stehen. Ausweitungen bei der Regulierung sind nur zu rechtfertigen, soweit monopolistische Engpassbereiche betroffen sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Miram, 2012. "Anforderungen an die konsistente Regulierung der Eisenbahnen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 81(1), pages 149-165.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:81-1-10
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.81.1.149
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural Monopoly; regulation; investments; transportation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation

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