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Leaving "Hotel California": How Incentives Affect Flows of Benefits in the Netherlands

  • Jan C. van Ours

This paper discusses developments in the Netherlands concerning unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and disability insurance. The emphasis is on how financial incentives for individual workers and firms affect flows of benefit recipients. The main message is that it is indeed helpful to screen workers who want to enter the benefit system, to establish counseling and monitoring of workers that are in the benefit system and to impose sanctions on workers or employers that abuse the system. The Dutch experience in reconstructing social security provides clear lessons for other countries. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklungen und Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung sowie der Renten- bzw. Erwerbsunfähigkeitsversicherung in den Niederlanden. Betrachtet wird vor allem, wie die damit verbundenen Anreize für Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber die Ein- und Austritte in die Versicherungssysteme beeinflussen. Das wesentliche Ergebnis ist, dass es hilfreich ist, die Leistungsbezieher beim Eintritt zu untersuchen, vorhandene Leistungsbezieher laufend zu beraten und zu überprüfen und Missbrauch zu sanktionieren. Insoweit sind die niederländischen Erfahrungen für andere Länder hilfreich.

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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 75 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 186-207

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Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:75-3-11
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  1. Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2002. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Working Paper Series 2002:21, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  2. de Jong, Philip & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Screening Disability Insurance Applications," IZA Discussion Papers 1981, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. van den Bergh, Gerhard & van deer Klaauw, Bas, 2001. "Counseling and monitoring of unemployed workers: theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment," Working Paper Series 2001:12, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  4. Jan Boone & Jan C. van Ours, 2000. "Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0973, Econometric Society.
  5. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas & van Ours, Jan C, 2000. "Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 2447, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Steve Nickell & Jan van Ours, 2000. "The Netherlands and the United Kingdom: a European unemployment miracle?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 135-180, 04.
  7. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, 07.
  8. Ruud de Mooij, 2006. "Reinventing the welfare state," CPB Special Publication 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  9. Hassink, R. & van Ours, J.C. & Ridder, G., 1997. "Dismissal through disability," Other publications TiSEM b756763d-1536-4d61-84e4-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  10. Rafael Lalive & Jan C. van Ours & Josef Zweim�ller, . "The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment," IEW - Working Papers 110, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  11. Martin Werding (ed.), 2006. "Structural Unemployment in Western Europe: Reasons and Remedies," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262232464, December.
  12. Jochen Kluve & Christoph M. Schmidt, 2002. "Can training and employment subsidies combat European unemployment?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 409-448, October.
  13. Cees Gorter & Guyonne R. J. Kalb, 1996. "Estimating the Effect of Counseling and Monitoring the Unemployed Using a Job Search Model," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 31(3), pages 590-610.
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