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Challenges of the Central Banks in the Post Crisis Period when Needed to Ensure the Financial Stability

Author

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  • Anisoara Niculina APETRI

    (Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava, Romania)

  • Camelia Catalina MIHALCIUC

    (Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava, Romania)

  • Oana Iuliana MIHAI

    (Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Romania)

Abstract

The concerns of the European and domestic monetary authorities to reform the current regulatory but also supervisory framework became our main reason to achieve this scientific approach. The international financial crisis has generated important dysfunctions at the level of the main activity of central banks but also at the level of the objectives that these banks should meet. Thereby, if most central banks have normally pursued the objective clearly stated in their mandate as "price stability", nowadays they are trying to achieve the "financial stability". Thus the main objective of this study particularly concerns: highlighting the role of central banks in ensuring the financial stability; and analyzing the challenges of the central banks after the financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Anisoara Niculina APETRI & Camelia Catalina MIHALCIUC & Oana Iuliana MIHAI, 2016. "Challenges of the Central Banks in the Post Crisis Period when Needed to Ensure the Financial Stability," Economics and Applied Informatics, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 2, pages 5-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:ddj:fseeai:y:2016:i:2:p:5-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
    2. Momirovic, Dragan & Mirdala, Rajmund, 2014. "Real Central Bank Independence in the Post-Crisis Period or Myth," Ekonomika, Journal for Economic Theory and Practice and Social Issues, Society of Economists Ekonomika, Nis, Serbia, vol. 60(01), March.
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