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Transparency of Banking Supervisors

  • Franka Liedorp
  • Robert Mosch
  • Carin van der Cruijsen
  • Jakob de Haan

Following Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), this paper constructs an index of transparency of banking supervisors that takes political, economic, procedural, policy, and operational transparency into account. Based on a survey, the index is constructed for 24 banking supervisors. The average score is 8.4 points (out of 15), whereas the minimum is 5.5 and the maximum 12 points. On average, political transparency is the highest in the sample, while procedural transparency is the lowest. The analysis suggests that it is very hard to identify factors that can explain the large differences in supervisory transparency, suggesting that country-specific developments drive transparency.

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Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal IMF Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 61 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 310-335

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Handle: RePEc:pal:imfecr:v:61:y:2013:i:2:p:310-335
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  1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
  3. Alessandro Gambini & Salim M. Darbar & Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision; Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund.
  4. repec:dgr:kubcen:200706 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Otmar Issing, 2001. "The EURO Area and the single monetary policy," Working Papers 44, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  6. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Other publications TiSEM b34dfb1f-520f-4787-a08f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  7. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  8. Issing, Otmar, 2001. "The Euro Area and the Single Monetary Policy," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 277-88, October.
  9. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Pierre L. Siklos, 2010. "Central Bank Transparency: Another Look," CAMA Working Papers 2010-23, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  11. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-172467 is not listed on IDEAS
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