Challenges for financial sector supervision
The financial crisis demonstrated severe shortcomings in existing global, European and national regulatory and supervisory frameworks for the financial system. Although most attention was paid to regulatory flaws, the failure to prevent a near collapse of the financial system also triggered a global rethinking of what constitutes good financial supervision. Several pre-crisis key principles underlying supervision - such as a high trust in market participants' ability to manage risks combined with a widespread belief that safeguarding the health of individual firms would guarantee system stability - and a general tendency towards light touch supervision, were strongly criticised (cf. FSA 2009; De Larosière 2009; Commissie de Wit 2010).
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