Transparency of banking supervisors
Following Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), we construct an index of transparency of banking supervisors that takes political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency into account. Based on a survey, we construct the index for 24 banking supervisors. There are large differences among transparency of supervisors. The average total score is 9.2 points (out of 15), whereas the minimum is 6.25 points and the maximum 12.75 points. The average of economic transparency is the highest, while the average score for policy transparency is the lowest. Our analysis suggests that it is very hard to identify factors that can explain these differences.
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- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008.
"Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
- Blinder, Alan S. & Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel & de Haan, Jakob & Jansen, David-Jan, 2008. "Central Bank communication and monetary policy: a survey of theory and evidence," Working Paper Series 898, European Central Bank.
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," DNB Working Papers 170, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Otmar Issing, 2001. "The EURO Area and the single monetary policy," Working Papers 44, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Other publications TiSEM b34dfb1f-520f-4787-a08f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P.M., 2004. "How Transparent Are Central Banks?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0411, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2009. "Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates," NBER Working Papers 14791, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Issing, Otmar, 2001. "The Euro Area and the Single Monetary Policy," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 277-288, October.
- Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
- Siklos,Pierre L., 2006. "The Changing Face of Central Banking," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521034494, August.
- Siklos,Pierre L., 2002. "The Changing Face of Central Banking," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521780254, September.
- Pierre Siklos, 2011. "Central bank transparency: another look," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(10), pages 929-933.
- Pierre L. Siklos, 2010. "Central Bank Transparency: Another Look," CAMA Working Papers 2010-23, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
- repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
- Alessandro Gambini & Salim M. Darbar & Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision; Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund.
- N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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