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Examining the relationship between rent and political expenditure: Using rent information obtained from financial statements

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  • Mihoko SHIMAMOTO

    ((bilgi yok))

Abstract

This study aims to develop a standard method for measuring the rent of an individual enterprise from its financial statement data and to analyze the relationship between rents of companies and their political and R&D expenditures. A method is developed to measure monopoly and monopsony rents using mark-up rates under monopolistic equilibrium and competitive equilibrium. Using time-series financial statement data of Japanese industries, the average rents were calculated for 29 industries over 30 years. These rents were then regressed against political and R&D expenditures of industries. The results show that political expenditure is significantly related to rent, whereas R&D expenditure is not.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihoko SHIMAMOTO, 2018. "Examining the relationship between rent and political expenditure: Using rent information obtained from financial statements," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, EconSciences Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 194-208, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ1:v:5:y:2018:i:2:p:194-208
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Iwata, Gyoichi, 1974. "Measurement of Conjectural Variations in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 947-966, September.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 45-65, Springer.
    3. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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