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Are Firms Gerrymandered?

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  • ARTÉS, JOAQUÍN
  • KAUFMAN, AARON R.
  • RICHTER, BRIAN K.
  • TIMMONS, JEFFREY F.

Abstract

We provide the first evidence that firms, not just voters, are gerrymandered. We compare allocations of firms in enacted redistricting plans to counterfactual distributions constructed using simulation methods. We find that firms are over-allocated to districts held by the mapmakers’ party when partisans control the redistricting process; maps drawn by courts and independent commissions allocate firms more proportionately. Our results hold when we account for the gerrymandering of seats: fixing the number of seats the mapmakers’ party wins, they obtain more firms than expected in their districts. Our research reveals that partisan mapmakers target more than just voters, shedding new light on the link between corporate and political power in the United States and opening new pathways for studying how mapmakers actually draw district boundaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Artés, Joaquín & Kaufman, Aaron R. & Richter, Brian K. & Timmons, Jeffrey F., 2025. "Are Firms Gerrymandered?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 687-707, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:119:y:2025:i:2:p:687-707_10
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Artés, Joaquín & Kaufman, Aaron Russell & Richter, Brian Kelleher & Timmons, Jeffrey F., 2022. "Are Firms Gerrymandered?," Working Papers 320, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.

    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Artés, Joaquín & Richter, Brian Kelleher & Timmons, Jeffrey F., 2019. "The Value of Political Geography: Evidence from the Redistricting of Firms," Working Papers 291, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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