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Zwangsjacke Euro. Die Fehlkonstruktion des Europäischen Economic Governance-Systems

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  • Arne Heise

Abstract

The persistence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is being questioned from all different political and economic orientations arguing that it is not in the economic interest of its member states to maintain the EMU but involving costs that could be avoided if EMU would be abandoned. In stark contrast to these opinions, most actors that are politically responsible cling to the project Euro and the European Commission even believes that the European Economic Governance System (EEGS), in which the Eurozone is embedded, is the institutionalized guarantor of stability of the real economy in an environment which has become more instable after the World Financial Crisis after 2008. This paper argues that - contrary to the European Commission’s claim - the EEGS has failed in managing the aftermath of the World Financial Crisis appropriately and that it has turned the Euro into a straightjacket which threatens to strangle some its member state.

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  • Arne Heise, 2014. "Zwangsjacke Euro. Die Fehlkonstruktion des Europäischen Economic Governance-Systems," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 40(1), pages 17-31.
  • Handle: RePEc:clr:wugarc:y:2014v:40i:1p:17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 65-89, June.
    2. Barry Eichengreen, 1997. "Saving Europe's Automatic Stabilisers," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 159(1), pages 92-98, January.
    3. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, April.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1995. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 1-31, March.
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    6. Arne Heise, 2011. "European Governance: Institutionelle Reformen nach der Krise," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;German National Library of Economics, vol. 91(9), pages 634-642, September.
    7. Arne Heise, 2008. "European economic governance: what is it, where are we and where do we go?," International Journal of Public Policy, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1/2), pages 1-19.
    8. Heise, Arne, 2011. "'European Governance: The EU gets tough' - Institutionelle Reformen nach der Krise," Working Papers on Economic Governance 38, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.
    9. Gianluca Cafiso, 2012. "Debt developments and fiscal adjustment in the EU," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 47(1), pages 61-72, January.
    10. Pusch, Toralf, 2012. "The role of uncertainty in the euro crisis: A reconsideration of liquidity preference theory," Discussion Papers 31, University of Hamburg, Centre for Economic and Sociological Studies (CESS/ZÖSS).
    11. Arne Heise & Özlem Görmez Heise, 2010. "Europäische Wirtschaftsregierung - Notwendige Ergänzung der EWU oder unrealistische Illusion?," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 36(3), pages 325-347.
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