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Two Different Conflicts in Federal Systems: An Application to Canada

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  • Jack Mintz

    (The University of Calgary)

Abstract

The analysis contained in this paper focuses on two different forms of regional conflict in a federation: conflict of taste and conflict of claim. These conflicts may support each other but not necessarily – they are independent in concept and have different implications for regional tensions. Conflict of taste arises from differences in political preferences amongst populations arising from institutions, historical context and culture. Conflict of claim arises from one region having greater wealth than others and being expected to share it with others. The latter is particularly problematical when the rich region is small and has little influence in determining transfers as large per capita transfers from a small rich are needed to have any significant impact on large populated poor regions. While, both conflicts lead to regional stress and a possible break-up of a federation, conflict of claim can be divisive since it focuses on sharing the pie rather than creating the pie.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack Mintz, 2019. "Two Different Conflicts in Federal Systems: An Application to Canada," SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 12(14), April.
    • Handle: RePEc:clh:resear:v:12:y:2019:i:14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holm, Joshua, 2016. "A model of redistribution under social identification in heterogeneous federations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 39-48.
    2. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Gérard Roland, 1997. "The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1057-1090.
    4. G. Kent Fellows, 2018. "Energy and Environmental Policy Trends: The Invisible Cost of Pipeline Constraints," SPP Communique, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 10(PT15), March.
    5. Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 2016. "The Political Economy of Heterogeneity and Conflict," CESifo Working Paper Series 6258, CESifo.
    6. Ross Hickey, 2013. "Bicameral bargaining and federation formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 217-241, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Floriana Cerniglia; Riccarda Longaretti; Alberto Zanardi, 2020. "The Emergence of Asymmetric Decentralization: Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces," CRANEC - Working Papers del Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale crn2001, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Centro di Ricerche in Analisi economica e sviluppo economico internazionale (CRANEC).
    2. Robert Mansell & Mukesh Khanal & Trevor Tombe, 2020. "The Regional Distribution of Federal Fiscal Balances: Who Pays, Who Gets and Why It Matters," SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 13(14), June.
    3. Fabio Fiorillo & Michele G. Giuranno & Agnese Sacchi, 2021. "Asymmetric decentralization: distortions and opportunities," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(2), pages 625-656, July.

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