Gobierno y papel de los cuadros directivos en las cooperativas brasileñas: Estudio comparativo
This study analyses the role played by management in Brazilian agricultural co-operatives in terms of how their objectives and their governance are focused. The analysis explores ways of running agricultural co-operatives, comparing traditional co-operatives, which focus on the economic side, and co-operative forms of financial solidarity, in which the social element is given priority. In analysing the role of management we used a number of concepts from the Theory of Agency, and a brief description is provided of the main concepts of this theory. The work concludes with an examination of the functions carried out by management, explaining that the managerial role depends on the financial or social focus of co-operative organisations, and that this focus in turn involves different functions and challenges for the managers of Brazilian co-operatives.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 48 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael Chaves, 1999. "La economía social como enfoque metodológico, como objeto de estudio y como disciplina científica," CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa, CIRIEC-España, issue 33, pages 115-139, December.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, "undated". "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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