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Gobierno y papel de los cuadros directivos en las cooperativas brasileñas: Estudio comparativo

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Listed:
  • Sigismundo Bialoskorski Neto

    (Universidad de São Paulo (Brasil))

Abstract

This study analyses the role played by management in Brazilian agricultural co-operatives in terms of how their objectives and their governance are focused. The analysis explores ways of running agricultural co-operatives, comparing traditional co-operatives, which focus on the economic side, and co-operative forms of financial solidarity, in which the social element is given priority. In analysing the role of management we used a number of concepts from the Theory of Agency, and a brief description is provided of the main concepts of this theory. The work concludes with an examination of the functions carried out by management, explaining that the managerial role depends on the financial or social focus of co-operative organisations, and that this focus in turn involves different functions and challenges for the managers of Brazilian co-operatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Sigismundo Bialoskorski Neto, 2004. "Gobierno y papel de los cuadros directivos en las cooperativas brasileñas: Estudio comparativo," CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa, CIRIEC-España, issue 48, pages 225-241, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cic:revcir:y:2004:i:48:p:225-241
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Martin Ricketts, . "The Economics of Business Enterprise," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3121.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    5. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Co-operatives; management; social economy and solidarity economy; Brasil.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L39 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Other
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M19 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Other

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