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Steuerwettbewerb und Finanzausgleich

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  • Thiess Büttner

Abstract

Angesichts der unvermindert anhaltenden Steuerkonkurrenz in der EU wird im politischen Raum vermehrt gefordert, die Zuteilung der Strukturfonds an eine Mindestbesteuerung zu knüpfen. Ungeachtet ihrer strategischen Natur lassen sich diese Forderungen im Prinzip durchaus im Rahmen der Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus rechtfertigen. Sie entsprechen der Logik eines Finanzausgleichs. Ein entsprechender europäischer Finanzausgleich würde allerdings so gravierende Probleme aufwerfen, dass an einer Reduktion der tariflichen Steuersätze in Deutschland kein Weg vorbeiführt. Ohnehin eignen sich die Strukturfonds nicht als Druckmittel, da sie aufgrund der Kofinanzierung die Mitgliedsländer der EU eher dazu veranlassen, ihre Steuersätze zu erhöhen.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiess Büttner, 2006. "Steuerwettbewerb und Finanzausgleich," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 59(04), pages 12-28, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:59:y:2006:i:04:p:12-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buettner, Thiess, 2006. "The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 477-497, February.
    2. Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, January.
    3. Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 1998. "Konfiskatorischer Finanzausgleich verlangt eine Reform," Munich Reprints in Economics 19398, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    4. Baretti, Christian & Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," Munich Reprints in Economics 20129, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Christian Baretti & Bernd Huber & Karl Lichtblau, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(6), pages 631-649, November.
    6. Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
    7. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    8. Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 1998. "Konfiskatorischer Finanzausgleich verlangt eine Reform," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 78(3), pages 142-147.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Steuerwettbewerb; Finanzausgleich; EU-Strukturfonds; Deutschland; EU-Staaten;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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