Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Treasury Auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Bidding behavior; treasury auctions; bidders’ pro tability; bidders’ heterogeneity; common values; ; Bidding behavior; treasury auctions; bidders’ pro tability; bidders’ heterogeneity; common values;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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