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The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes

Author

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  • Yahagi Ken

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1, Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo169-8050, Japan)

Abstract

This paper presents a simple theoretical model to analyze the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. This paper focuses on two important roles of hate groups; as providers of membership benefits for group members and as a coordination device for leadership. This paper shows that this interaction implies the possibility of multiple equilibria of the crime rate. This result explains why hate crimes and extreme criminal activities vary across communities and over time, and why a social shock such as 9/11 resulted in a rapid increase of hate crimes. Moreover, if hate groups work as coordination devices, the existence of hate groups may increase hate crimes. This result supports recent empirical results analyzing relationships between hate groups and hate crimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Yahagi Ken, 2019. "The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 1-14, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:15:y:2019:i:3:p:14:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bar-Gill, Oren & Harel, Alon, 2001. "Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 485-501, Part I Ju.
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    3. Patricia Funk, 2005. "Governmental Action, Social Norms, and Criminal Behavior," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 522-535, September.
    4. Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 6(1), pages 185-207.
    5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Sean Mulholland, 2013. "White supremacist groups and hate crime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 91-113, October.
    8. Ben-Shahar, Omri & Harel, Alon, 1995. "Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions against Crime," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 434-455, October.
    9. Ryan, Matt E. & Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Hate groups and hate crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 256-262.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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