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Going for the Green: A Simulation Study of Qualifying Success Probabilities in Professional Golf

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  • Connolly Robert A.

    (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

  • Rendleman Richard J.

    (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Abstract

Each year, over 1,300 golfers attempt to qualify for the PGA TOUR through Q-School. Using simulation, we estimate the probabilities that Q-School correctly identifies high-skill golfers. We show that players with skill equivalent to the very best on the PGA TOUR would have high probabilities of qualifying, but others, equal in skill to many active PGA TOUR members, would have low odds of qualifying. We explore the impact of variations in Q-school structure on qualifying probabilities for players with different skill levels, but most of the variations that improve tournament efficiency are largely impractical.

Suggested Citation

  • Connolly Robert A. & Rendleman Richard J., 2011. "Going for the Green: A Simulation Study of Qualifying Success Probabilities in Professional Golf," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 7(4), pages 1-50, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jqsprt:v:7:y:2011:i:4:n:7
    DOI: 10.2202/1559-0410.1308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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