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Time Preference, Government, And The Process Of De-Civilization – From Monarchy To Democracy

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  • Hoppe Hans-Hermann

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  • Hoppe Hans-Hermann, 1994. "Time Preference, Government, And The Process Of De-Civilization – From Monarchy To Democracy," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 319-352, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:5:y:1994:i:2-3:p:34:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-1994-2-305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matei-Alexandru APÃVÃLOAEI & Octavian-Dragomir JORA, 2014. "“Deciphering The Political Entrepreneur’S Black Box”: On The Income Function Of The Ultimate Decision Maker In State Affairs," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 13, pages 153-174, June.

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