IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/69615.html

The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Besley, Timothy
  • Reynal-Querol, Marta

Abstract

Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Timothy & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2017. "The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69615, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:69615
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69615/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan & Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2024. "Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(6), pages 2870-2908.
    2. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
    3. Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Ruzzante, Matteo & Pizzimenti, Cristoforo, 2025. "Brigandage and the political legacy of monarchical legitimacy in Southern Italy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    5. Miltos Makris & Theodore Palivos & Marios Zachariadis, 2020. "Representative Democracy with or without Elections: An Economic Analysis," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 06-2020, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    6. Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "Governance and the dimensions of autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 131-148, June.
    7. Sebastian Ottinger & Nico Voigtländer, 2025. "History's Masters The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(1), pages 95-128, January.
    8. Yamasaki, Junichi, 2020. "Time horizon of government and public goods investment: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    9. Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023. "Political Dynasties in Defense of Democracy: The Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 359-397, June.
    10. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Khalifa, Sherif & Konso Mulali, Ben, 2020. "Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? Evidence From DRC," MPRA Paper 103022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Joshy Z. Easaw & Samuli Leppälä, 2023. "Democracy, state capacity and public finance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 301-321, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:69615. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.