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The Nature of Institutional Impediments to Economic Development

  • Pranab Bardhan.

In the literature on the new institutional economics it is now standard to refer to the deficiencies of the legal and contractual systems and of the regulatory state as blocking economic progress. In understanding the history of underdevelopment of countries like India one, however needs to go beyond these obviously important issues and focus upon institutional impediments that are outcomes of distributive conflicts and the collective action problems they exacerbate. These collective action problems arise both at the level of the state (inefficient interventionism may only be a symptom of those underlying problems) and at the level of the local community.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C96-066.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c96-066
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  1. Bardhan, Pranab, 1989. "The new institutional economics and development theory: A brief critical assessment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1389-1395, September.
  2. Tirole, J., 1993. "The Internal Organization of Government," Working papers 93-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1003-26, October.
  4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  5. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Eichengreen, Barry & Simmons, Beth, 1993. "International Economics and Domestic Politics: Notes on the 1920s," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233212, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
  7. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Andrew K. Rose, 1996. "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: Empirical Indicators," NBER Working Papers 5437, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz, 1999. "Development banking," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 83-100, February.
  9. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-76, August.
  10. Greif, Avner, 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 912-50, October.
  11. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1993. "Power, distortions, revolt, and reform in agricultural land relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1164, The World Bank.
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