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Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games

Author

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  • Nielsen Carsten S.

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Ø ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353, Copenhagen K, Denmark)

  • Sebald Alexander

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Ø ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353, Copenhagen K, Denmark)

Abstract

Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Nielsen Carsten S. & Sebald Alexander, 2017. "Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-29, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:17:y:2017:i:1:p:29:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edward P. Lazear & Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto A. Weber, 2012. "Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 136-163, January.
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    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    5. Carsten S. Nielsen & Alexander Sebald, 2010. "Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games," Discussion Papers 10-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Feb 2011.
    6. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2022. "Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 833-882, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unawareness; psychological payoffs; extensive-form rationalizability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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