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Optimal Patent Protection: A Macroeconomic Perspective

Author

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  • Meng Samuel

    (University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales 2351, Australia)

Abstract

The need to balance the positive and negative effects of patent monopoly is at the heart of design and reform of the patent system. However, by scrutinizing prior studies on optimal patent design, this paper has found that the basis for this balanced approach is flawed. Furthermore, a macroeconomic analysis of the patent system confirms that there is no trade-off in patent protection, unless the patent system generates only marginal negative effects. The implication of this finding is that a new patent system design is needed to stimulate innovation directly while minimizing deadweight loss.

Suggested Citation

  • Meng Samuel, 2017. "Optimal Patent Protection: A Macroeconomic Perspective," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-16, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:16:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2016-0021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deadweight loss; optimal patent design; patent monopoly; social benefit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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