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Pakistan: Economy under Elites – Tax Amnesty Schemes, 2018

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  • Ahmed Muhammad Ashfaq

    (Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad, Pakistan)

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to take an incisive glimpse into Pakistan’s political economy through the lens of a tax policy abnorm i.e. the tax amnesty scheme, 2018. The paper is theoretically anchored in the elitist framework which arguably best explains structural composition of the economy. The paper refines the elitist framework, accentuates its significance, and innovates on it to induct the competing Freudian concepts of “pleasure principle” and “reality principle” to sharpen our understanding of Pakistan’s political economy. It is argued that impending inflows of offshore bank and financial account information of Pakistan resident persons under the OECD’s Multilateral Convention was the main dynamic of the amnestization initiative in which the Supreme Court of Pakistan played the role of the agent provocateur. The empirical results obtained help conclude that the amnestization initiatives have helped proliferate underground economy, and enhance the elitist economic status quo in Pakistan.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed Muhammad Ashfaq, 2019. "Pakistan: Economy under Elites – Tax Amnesty Schemes, 2018," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:10:y:2019:i:2:p:18:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2019-0016
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    1. Ahmed Muhammad Ashfaq, 2019. "Pakistan: Economy under Elites – Tax Amnesty Schemes, 2018," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, August.
    2. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Sally Wallace, 2009. "Do Tax Amnesties Work? The Revenue Effects Of Tax Amnesties During The Transition In The Russian Federation," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 235-253, September.
    3. Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1987. "Amnesty, Enforcement, and Tax Policy," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 55-86, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bayer, Ralph-C. & Oberhofer, Harald & Winner, Hannes, 2015. "The occurrence of tax amnesties: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 70-82.
    5. Attiya Waris & Laila Abdul Latif, 2014. "The effect of tax amnesty on anti-money laundering in Bangladesh," Journal of Money Laundering Control, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 17(2), pages 243-255, May.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1991. "The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-159, July.
    7. Muhammad Alishahdani Ibrahim & Rita Myrna & Ira Irawati & J. B. Kristiadi, 2017. "A Systematic Literature Review on Tax Amnesty in 9 Asian Countries," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(3), pages 220-225.
    8. Nur Sayidah & Aminullah Assagaf, 2019. "Tax amnesty from the perspective of tax official," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 1659909-165, January.
    9. Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, 2016. "Pakistan?s Governance Goliath: The Case of Non-Professional Chairman, FBR," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 621-656.
    10. Graetz, Michael & Wilde, Louis, 1993. "The decision by strategic nonfilers to participate in income tax amnesties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 271-283, September.
    11. Julio López-Laborda & Fernando Rodrigo, 2003. "Tax Amnesties and Income Tax Compliance: The Case of Spain," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 24(1), pages 73-96, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmed Muhammad Ashfaq, 2019. "Pakistan: Economy under Elites – Tax Amnesty Schemes, 2018," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, August.
    2. Shahryar Bahawal, 2021. "Tax Amnesties in Tax Reform Policy: A Case Study from Pakistan and Lessons for Developing Economies," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, April.
    3. Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed, 2022. "UN MTC Article 26: Inequitable Exchange of Information Regime—Questionable Efficacy in Asymmetrical Bilateral Settings," Laws, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-23, August.
    4. Mahmood Khalid & Naseem Faraz, 2022. "A Critical Appraisal of Tax Expenditures in Pakistan," PIDE Knowledge Brief 2022:50, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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