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Sesgos de política económica cuando las autoridades fiscales y monetarias tienen objetivos diferentes

  • Herman Bennet

    (Banco Central de Chile)

  • Norman Loayza O.

    (Banco Central de Chile)

La pregunta que se aborda en este trabajo es qué sesgos de política económica pueden ocurrir cuando las autoridades monetarias y las fiscales tienen preferencias distintas en cuanto a la importancia de cerrar las brechas de producción e inflación generadas por shocks adversos. Para cumplir con dicho objetivo, el presente estudio utiliza un modelo de teoría de juegos en el cual las autoridades fiscales y monetarias interactúan para estabilizar la economía, teniendo diferentes preferencias y controlando distintos instrumentos de política. Modelada ya sea como un equilibrio tipo Nash o tipo Stackelberg, la ausencia de coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas implica que un aumento en la divergencia de preferencias entre las autoridades fiscales y monetarias, lleva, ceteris paribus, a mayores déficit fiscales (el instrumento de política de la autoridad fiscal) y a mayores tasas de interés real (el instrumento del Banco Central). La sección empírica de este trabajo provee evidencia a favor de esta conclusión en una muestra de panel de 19 países industrializados con información anual para el período 1970-94. El estudio concluye que reformas de segunda generación que faciliten la coordinación de políticas pueden aliviar los sesgos de excesivo conservadurismo de la autoridad monetaria y liberalismo de la autoridad fiscal.

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Article provided by Banco Central de Bolivia in its journal Revista de Análisis.

Volume (Year): 5 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 123-156

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Handle: RePEc:blv:journl:v:5:y:2002:i:1:p:123-156
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  1. Walsh, Carl E., 1993. "Central bank strategies, credibility, and independence : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 287-302, November.
  2. William D. Nordhaus, 1994. "Policy games: Coordination and Independece in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(2), pages 139-216.
  3. Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Tapia, Matias, 2002. "Inflation targeting in Chile," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-146, August.
  4. Loewy, Michael B, 1988. "Reaganomics and Reputation Revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 253-63, April.
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