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Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

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  • Emilie R. Feldman

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  • Emilie R. Feldman, 2016. "Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2011-2030, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:37:y:2016:i:10:p:2011-2030
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    2. Ho, Kung-Cheng & Yao, Chia-ling & Zhao, Chenfang & Pan, Zikui, 2022. "Modern health pandemic crises and stock price crash risk," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 448-463.
    3. Vitkova, Valeriya & Tian, Siyang & Sudarsanam, Sudi, 2023. "Allocative efficiency of internal capital markets: Evidence from equity carve-outs by diversified firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    4. Mehmet Nasih Tağ, 2022. "The Dark Side of Firm Diversity: An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Firm Diversity on Resource Allocation Efficiency in Multidivisional Firms," Istanbul Business Research, Istanbul University Business School, vol. 51(2), pages 643-668, November.

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