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Market structure and gender disparity in health care: preferences, competition, and quality of care

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  • Ryan C. McDevitt
  • James W. Roberts

Abstract

type="main"> We consider the relationship between market structure and health outcomes in a setting where patients have stark preferences: urology patients disproportionately match with a urologist of the same gender. In the United States, however, fewer than 6% of urologists are women despite women constituting 30% of patients. We explain a portion of this disparity with a model of imperfect competition in which urology groups strategically differentiate themselves by employing female urologists. These strategic effects may influence women's health, as markets without a female urologist have a 7.3% higher death rate for female bladder cancer, all else equal.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan C. McDevitt & James W. Roberts, 2014. "Market structure and gender disparity in health care: preferences, competition, and quality of care," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 116-139, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:1:p:116-139
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1756-2171.12044
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    References listed on IDEAS

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