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Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie


  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Dennis C. Mueller


It is often said that the parliament should represent the opinions found in the population and that the government should be held accountable for its political program. It is shown in the paper that these two functions rely on two different basic models of democracy which are not fully compatible with each other: the model of a pure representative democracy and the model of a pure two party competition. Unaccountable governments, voter alienation, strategic voting, and governmental instability are shown to be consequences of this institutional mix. These problems may be avoided with reforms towards one or the other basic model. Copyright Verein fü Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Charles B. Blankart & Dennis C. Mueller, 2002. "Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:1-21

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    2. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Probabilistic Voting and Equilibrium: An Impossibility Result," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 35-48, April.
    3. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2004. "Federalism, Decentralization, and Economic Growth," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200430, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    2. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism and Economic Performance: Evidence from Swiss Cantons," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200420, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    3. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2004. "Demokratiedefizit in Europa? Über Dichtung und Wahrheit in der europäischen Verfassungsdebatte," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    5. Christiansen Arndt, 2010. "Governance in der Wirtschaftspolitik. Besprechung des von Renate Ohr herausgegebenen Tagungsbandes," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 61(1), pages 402-407, January.
    6. Lars Feld, 2005. "The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March.
    7. Charles B. Blankart & Gerrit B. Koester, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 4(2), pages 169-183, May.

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