Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie
It is often said that the parliament should represent the opinions found in the population and that the government should be held accountable for its political program. It is shown in the paper that these two functions rely on two different basic models of democracy which are not fully compatible with each other: the model of a pure representative democracy and the model of a pure two party competition. Unaccountable governments, voter alienation, strategic voting, and governmental instability are shown to be consequences of this institutional mix. These problems may be avoided with reforms towards one or the other basic model. Copyright Verein fü Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002
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Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000.
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- Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)