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Do Doctors Induce Demand?

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  • Beomsoo Kim

Abstract

This paper examines supply‐induced demand in medicine using an exogenous income shock to obstetricians and gynaecologists caused by a declining number of births in their practice location from 1989 to 1999. The results of the present study indicate some evidence of induced demand. A 4.1 percentage point increase in Caesarean section procedures is found for a one unit decline in the birth rate per 100 population. Interestingly, people commence prenatal care statistically significantly earlier with fertility decline and, subsequently, the total number of prenatal care visits has been increased. However, I found no evidence of declining fertility inducing excessive prenatal care visits.

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  • Beomsoo Kim, 2010. "Do Doctors Induce Demand?," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 554-575, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:15:y:2010:i:4:p:554-575
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2010.00515.x
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    1. Diana S. Lien & William N. Evans, 2005. "Estimating the Impact of Large Cigarette Tax Hikes: The Case of Maternal Smoking and Infant Birth Weight," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(2).
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    7. Beomsoo Kim, 2007. "The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages 79-119, June.
    8. Gruber, Jon & Kim, John & Mayzlin, Dina, 1999. "Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diana Cheung & Jean-Pierre Laffargue & Ysaline Padieu, 2016. "Insurance of Household Risks and the Rebalancing of the Chinese Economy: Health Insurance, Health Expenses and Household Savings," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 381-412, August.
    2. Wen-Yi Chen, 2013. "Do caesarean section rates ‘catch-up’? Evidence from 14 European countries," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 328-340, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I19 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Other
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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