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The Impact of Maternity Leave Laws on Cesarean Delivery

Author

Listed:
  • Stoddard Christiana

    ()

  • Stock Wendy A.
  • Hogenson Elise

    (Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University, 309A Linfield Hall, Bozeman, Montana 59717, USA)

Abstract

Through their influence on insurance and relative leave length, maternity leave laws can alter the incentives to choose cesarean delivery. We use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact of state-level maternity leave laws on cesarean delivery. Empirical results suggest that maternity leave laws guaranteeing relatively short leaves are associated with reduced probability of cesarean delivery. Laws that guarantee continued insurance coverage during the leave are associated with an increase in the probability of cesarean delivery among insured women.

Suggested Citation

  • Stoddard Christiana & Stock Wendy A. & Hogenson Elise, 2016. "The Impact of Maternity Leave Laws on Cesarean Delivery," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 321-364, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:16:y:2016:i:1:p:321-364:n:10
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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