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Optimal insurance contract design with government disaster relief

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  • Sebastian Hinck

Abstract

I examine the design of optimal insurance contracts considering the possibility of government disaster relief payments. This work focuses on the impact of (risky and ambiguous) government disaster relief on the shape of optimal private insurance contracts. I demonstrate that the optimal insurance contract is a straight deductible contract in the case of a fixed probability of government relief. This result is robust to ambiguity in the probability of relief payments, even for ambiguity‐averse decision makers. If government disaster relief becomes more likely for larger losses, then the optimal insurance contract features coinsurance above a deductible. I also extend this analysis to more general stochastic dominance relationships between disaster relief and loss magnitude.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Hinck, 2024. "Optimal insurance contract design with government disaster relief," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 91(2), pages 415-447, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:91:y:2024:i:2:p:415-447
    DOI: 10.1111/jori.12442
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