IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v9y2007i4p683-698.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Poverty-Reducing and Welfare-Improving Marginal Public Price and Price Cap Reforms

Author

Listed:
  • PAUL MAKDISSI
  • QUENTIN WODON

Abstract

This paper extends familiar results on the optimal pricing of publicly provided goods and price cap regulations in a stochastic dominance framework. The key advantage is that the assessment as to whether pricing or price cap reforms are poverty reducing or welfare improving is not contingent on any given social welfare function. Rather, robust assessments of the impact of reforms can be made for wide classes of ethical judgments. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Makdissi & Quentin Wodon, 2007. "Poverty-Reducing and Welfare-Improving Marginal Public Price and Price Cap Reforms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 683-698, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:4:p:683-698
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00325.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boadway, Robin & Cuff, Katherine & Marchand, Maurice, 2000. " Optimal Income Taxation with Quasi-linear Preferences Revisited," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 435-460.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
    3. M. Hungerbühler & E. Lehmann & A. Parmentier & P. Van Der Linden, 2003. "Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides," Working Papers ERMES 0306, ERMES, University Paris 2.
    4. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    5. William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, 1997. "Monopsony in the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 86-112.
    6. Lollivier, Stefan & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1983. "Bunching and second-order conditions: A note on optimal tax theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 392-400.
    7. STROBL, Eric & WALSH, Frank, 2003. "Dealing with monopsony power: the case for using employment subsidies," CORE Discussion Papers 2003079, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Mathias, HUNGERBUELHER & Etienne, LEHMANN & Alexis PARMENTIER & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2003024, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    9. Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1165-1185.
    10. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, December.
    11. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 261-293.
    12. Jesus Seade, 1982. "On the Sign of the Optimum Marginal Income Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 637-643.
    13. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 213-240.
    14. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 213-240.
    15. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 16(2), pages 143-165, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Paul Makdissi & Stéphane Mussard, 2006. "Between-Group Transfers and Poverty-Reducing Tax Reforms," Cahiers de recherche 06-23, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    2. Valentini, Edilio, 2015. "Indirect taxation, public pricing and price cap regulation: A synthesis," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 9, pages 1-39.
    3. Lapo Filistrucchi & Tobias J. Klein & Thomas O. Michielsen, 2012. "Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects In A Two-Sided Market: An Application To The Dutch Daily Newspaper Market," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 297-329.
    4. Alessandro Petretto, 2009. "On the Impact of Productive Efficiency and Quality of a Regulated Local Public Utility Upon Final Goods Prices and Consumer's Welfare," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, pages 311-339.
    5. Ajitava Raychaudhuri & Sudip Kumar Sinha & Poulomi Roy, 2007. "Is the Value Added Tax Reform in India Poverty-Improving? An Analysis of Data from Two Major States," Working Papers PMMA 2007-18, PEP-PMMA.
    6. Stéphane Mussard & Patrick Richard, 2012. "Linking Yitzhaki's and Dagum's Gini decompositions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(23), pages 2997-3010, August.
    7. Garcia-Diaz, Rocio & Sosa-Rub, Sandra G., 2011. "Analysis of the distributional impact of out-of-pocket health payments: Evidence from a public health insurance program for the poor in Mexico," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, pages 707-718.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:4:p:683-698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.