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Star Ratings and the Incentives of Mutual Funds

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  • CHONG HUANG
  • FEI LI
  • XI WENG

Abstract

We propose a theory of reputation to explain how investors rationally respond to mutual fund star ratings. A fund's performance is determined by its information advantage, which can be acquired but decays stochastically. Investors form beliefs about whether the fund is informed based on its past performance. We refer to such beliefs as fund reputation, which determines fund flows. As performance changes continuously, equilibrium fund reputation may take discrete values only and thus can be labeled with stars. Star upgrades thus imply reputation jumps, leading to discrete increases in flows and expected performance, although stars do not provide new information.

Suggested Citation

  • Chong Huang & Fei Li & Xi Weng, 2020. "Star Ratings and the Incentives of Mutual Funds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1715-1765, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:75:y:2020:i:3:p:1715-1765
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12888
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    4. Mugerman, Yevgeny & Steinberg, Nadav & Wiener, Zvi, 2022. "The exclamation mark of Cain: Risk salience and mutual fund flows," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
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    6. Becker, Martin G. & Martin, Fabio & Walter, Andreas, 2022. "The power of ESG transparency: The effect of the new SFDR sustainability labels on mutual funds and individual investors," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    7. Linn K. Aasheim & António F. Miguel & Sofia B. Ramos, 2022. "Star rating, fund flows and performance predictability: evidence from Norway," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 36(1), pages 29-56, March.
    8. Otero-González, Luis & Leite, Paulo & Durán-Santomil, Pablo & Domingues, Renato, 2022. "Morningstar Star ratings and the performance, risk and flows of European bond mutual funds," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 479-496.
    9. Pornanong Budsaratragoon & Boonlert Jitmaneeroj, 2021. "Fund Ratings of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) Funds: A Precautionary Note," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(14), pages 1-25, July.

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