Managerial Incentives for Takeovers
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- Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 185, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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- Thomas Giebe & Miyu Lee, 2015. "Competitors In Merger Control: Shall They Be Merely Heard Or Also Listened To?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2015-011, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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- Kuipers, Jerome & Olaizola Ortega, María Norma, 2004. "Internal Organization of Firms and Cartel Formation," IKERLANAK 2004-15, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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