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Primetime Spin: Media Bias and Belief Confirming Information

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  • Jeremy Burke

Abstract

This paper develops a model of media bias in which rational agents acquire all their news from the source that is most likely to confirm their prior beliefs. Despite only wishing to make the correct decision, agents act as if they enjoy receiving news that supports their preconceptions. By exclusively gathering information from a source biased towards his prior, there is little chance an agent will be persuaded to change his mind. Moreover, it is shown that even an unbiased agent prefers to receive biased news as it is unlikely to produce conflicting reports. The media caters to the informational demands of consumers and accordingly slants its reporting. It is shown that competition may not decrease bias, but may actually enhance it. Finally, even when it increases bias, competition may improve welfare by expanding the market for news.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Burke, 2008. "Primetime Spin: Media Bias and Belief Confirming Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 633-665, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:17:y:2008:i:3:p:633-665
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00189.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Margaret A. Meyer, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41.
    2. Bartosz Mackowiak & Mirko Wiederholt, 2009. "Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 769-803, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Garz, Marcel & Sörensen, Jil & Stone, Daniel F., 2020. "Partisan selective engagement: Evidence from Facebook," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 91-108.
    2. Archishman Chakraborty & Parikshit Ghosh, 2016. "Character Endorsements and Electoral Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 277-310, May.
    3. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2009. "A Citizens-Editors Model of News Media," MPRA Paper 18213, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro & Daniel F. Stone, 2014. "Media Bias in the Marketplace: Theory," NBER Working Papers 19880, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Market for News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1031-1053, September.
    6. Sonin, Konstantin & Gitmez, Arda & Wright, Austin L., 2020. "Political Economy of Crisis Response," CEPR Discussion Papers 14778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. John Gasper, 2009. "Reporting for sale: the market for news coverage," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 493-508, December.
    8. Garz, Marcel & Sood, Gaurav & Stone, Daniel F. & Wallace, Justin, 2020. "The supply of media slant across outlets and demand for slant within outlets: Evidence from US presidential campaign news," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Ascensión Andina Díaz, 2011. "Mass Media in Economics: Origins and Subsequent Contributions," Working Papers 2011-02, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    10. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Alessandro Vaglio, 2015. "Pin-ups and Journalists: A Model of Media Market with News and Entertainment," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 217-245, October.
    11. Anqi Li & Lin Hu, 2020. "Electoral Accountability and Selection with Personalized Information Aggregation," Papers 2009.03761, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    12. Li, Anqi & Hu, Lin, 2023. "Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 296-315.
    13. Lin Hu & Anqi Li & Ilya Segal, 2019. "The Politics of Personalized News Aggregation," Papers 1910.11405, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    14. Stone, Daniel F., 2011. "Ideological media bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 256-271, May.
    15. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2024. "Persuasion in social media: smoke and mirrors," Discussion Papers 24-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    16. Agostino Manduchi, 2013. "Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 1-25, May.
    17. Rajesh Bagchi & Sung H. Ham & Chuan He, 2020. "Strategic Implications of Confirmation Bias‐Inducing Advertising," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(6), pages 1573-1596, June.
    18. A. Arda Gitmez & Pooya Molavi, 2022. "Informational Autocrats, Diverse Societies," Papers 2203.12698, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    19. Jacopo Perego & Sevgi Yuksel, 2022. "Media Competition and Social Disagreement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(1), pages 223-265, January.

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