IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jcmkts/v43y2005i2p371-391.html

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy Co‐ordination in EMU: From Disciplinarian Device to Insurance Arrangement

Author

Listed:
  • WALTRAUD SCHELKLE

Abstract

The fiscal policy framework of EMU and possible reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact have elicited much debate. The pact has been predicated on a conception of it as a device to discipline Member States. This gives rise to a paradox in which the credibility of policy‐makers it is supposed to enhance is undermined. The article puts forward an alternative conception of policy co‐ordination — collective insurance — designed to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal stabilization. The two approaches lead to different interpretations of how domestic interests affect policy‐making. The insurance approach is shown to support various reform proposals by the Commission.

Suggested Citation

  • Waltraud Schelkle, 2005. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy Co‐ordination in EMU: From Disciplinarian Device to Insurance Arrangement," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 371-391, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:371-391
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0021-9886.2005.00560.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2005.00560.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2005.00560.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    2. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Waltraud Schelkle, 2018. "The political economy of monetary solidarity: revisiting the euro experiment," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 44(3), pages 371-403.
    2. Jan Cimburek & Pavel Řežábek, 2010. "Central Banking in the Rule of Law Context in the Czech Republic [Centrální bankovnictví v kontextu právního řádu na území České republiky]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2010(2), pages 18-31.
    3. Baerg, Nicole Rae & Hallerberg, Mark, 2014. "Rule Bending in International Organizations: Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact," MPRA Paper 18084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Vassilis Monastiriotis & Sotirios Zartaloudis, 2010. "Beyond the crisis: EMU and labour market reform pressures in good and bad times," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 23, European Institute, LSE.
    5. Waltraud Schelkle, 2010. "Good Governance in Crisis or a Good Crisis for Governance? A Comparison of the EU and the US," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 16, European Institute, LSE.
    6. Luca Barbone & Grzegorz Poniatowski, 2013. "Post-Crisis Lesson for EMU Governance from the Principal-Agent Approach," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0457, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    7. Waltraud Schelkle, 2013. "Monetary integration in crisis: how well do existing theories explain the predicament of EMU?," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 19(1), pages 37-48, February.
    8. Nazaré Costa Cabral, 2016. "Which Budgetary Union for the E(M)U?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(6), pages 1280-1295, November.
    9. Schelkle, Waltraud, 2018. "The political economy of monetary solidarity: revisiting the Euro experiment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90201, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Ioannou, Demosthenes & Stracca, Livio, 2014. "Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-17.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    2. William Miles, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 65-79.
    3. Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2002. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 299-330, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    5. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    6. Mazumder, Sandeep, 2014. "Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 117-135.
    7. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.
    8. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Discussion Paper 1995-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    9. Montoya, Miguel A. & Trillas, Francesc, 2007. "The measurement of the independence of telecommunications regulatory agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 182-190, September.
    10. MARTÍNEZ-RUIZ, Elena & NOGUES-MARCO, Pilar, 2018. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Stability During the Gold Standard. Spain 1874—1914," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-75, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    12. Michael Berlemann & Kai Hielscher, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    13. Höpner, Martin, 2019. "The German undervaluation regime under Bretton Woods: How Germany became the nightmare of the world economy," MPIfG Discussion Paper 19/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    14. Artha, I.K.D.S. & de Haan, J., 2010. "Legal and actual central bank independence," Research Report 10004, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    15. Berument, Hakan & Nergiz Dincer, N., 2005. "Inflation and inflation uncertainty in the G-7 countries," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 348(C), pages 371-379.
    16. Alex Cukierman, 1998. "The Economics of Central Banking," International Economic Association Series, in: Holger C. Wolf (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 3, pages 37-82, Palgrave Macmillan.
    17. Arifovic, Jasmina & Yıldızoğlu, Murat, 2019. "Learning the Ramsey outcome in a Kydland & Prescott economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 191-208.
    18. Viv Hall, 2003. "Central Bank Governance: Common Elements or Different Models?," Working Papers 202003, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    19. Thomas Jordan, 2001. "Monetary control uncertainty and inflation bias," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 125-147, June.
    20. Da Silva, Sergio & Nunes, Mauricio, 2007. "Latin American foreign exchange intervention - Updated," MPRA Paper 1982, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:371-391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0021-9886 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.