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Under (Financial) Pressure

Author

Listed:
  • Spencer Barnes
  • Ted Dischman
  • Brandon Mendez

Abstract

We examine how financial pressure influences rule enforcement by leveraging a novel setting: NFL officiating. Unlike traditional regulatory environments, NFL officiating decisions are immediate, transparent, and publicly scrutinized, providing a unique empirical lens to test whether a worsening financial climate shapes enforcement behavior. Analyzing 13,136 defensive penalties from 2015 to 2023, we find that postseason officiating disproportionately favors the Mahomes‐era Kansas City Chiefs, coinciding with the team's emergence as a key driver of TV viewership/ratings and, thereby, revenue. Our study suggests that financial reliance on dominant entities can alter enforcement dynamics, a concern with implications far beyond sports governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer Barnes & Ted Dischman & Brandon Mendez, 2026. "Under (Financial) Pressure," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 305-326, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finrev:v:61:y:2026:i:1:p:305-326
    DOI: 10.1111/fire.70020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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