Effects of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in transition economies
In transition countries, the real impact of banking crises has so far been rather moderate. We study the effect of bank insolvency on corporate incentives in a model where incumbent banks possess an informational advantage. We find that bank insolvency reduces the incentive to restructure for firms whose incumbent bank becomes insolvent. However, bank insolvency provides an additional incentive for firms that enter the credit market to develop new projects because it reduces asymmetric information between banks. Firms' credit costs are thereby lowered. We also explain a path-dependent development by demonstrating that the firms' decision to develop new projects depends on the banks' share of non-performing loans. Copyright (c) 2005 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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