Risque juridique et rôle des banques dans le gouvernement des entreprises
During the last decade, there was a growing body of case law of lender liability in the United States and France. This doctrine, whose prime goal is to protect investors against opportunism by banks, limits the involvement of banks in the management of commercial firms. This article explores the consequences of this doctrine of lender liability. We ask three questions : what's the « dark side » of relationship banking ? Why do we see such variation across countries concerning lender liability ? Is the lender liability doctrine efficient ?
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, Association FCS, 2002, 5 (4), pp.137-175|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00467737|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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