IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecorec/v91y2015i292p79-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bank Capital Regulation with Asymmetric Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Damien S. Eldridge
  • Heajin H. Ryoo
  • Axel Wieneke

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecor12152-abs-0001"> When financial markets are global, the impacts of national banking regulations extend beyond national borders. While lax regulatory enforcement improves the profitability of home banks, it also increases loan supply, which in turn reduces the global interest rate spreads. In a two-country model we show that each regulator's enforcement choice is affected by the relative size of the national financial market. An authority regulating a smaller market has a smaller impact on global interest rates and therefore a stronger incentive to relax regulatory enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien S. Eldridge & Heajin H. Ryoo & Axel Wieneke, 2015. "Bank Capital Regulation with Asymmetric Countries," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 91(292), pages 79-90, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:91:y:2015:i:292:p:79-90
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecor.2015.91.issue-292
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521331586, Enero-Abr.
    2. Hans-Werner Sinn, 2002. "Risktaking, Limited Liability, and the Competition of Bank Regulators," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(3), pages 305-329, August.
    3. Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
    4. Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2008. "Rethinking Bank Regulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521709309, Enero-Abr.
    5. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    6. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Park, Sungmin & Kim, Young-Han, 2018. "International policy coordination for financial regime stability under cross-border externalities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 177-188.
    2. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2022. "Financial spillovers, spillbacks, and the scope for international macroprudential policy coordination," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 79-127, February.
    3. David VanHoose, 2013. "Should Financial Regulators Engage in International Policy Coordination?," NFI Policy Briefs 2013-PB-04, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boyer, Pierre C. & Kempf, Hubert, 2020. "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    2. Nassios, Jason & Giesecke, James A. & Dixon, Peter B. & Rimmer, Maureen T., 2020. "What impact do differences in financial structure have on the macro effects of bank capital requirements in the United States and Australia?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 429-446.
    3. Vollmer Uwe, 2015. "‚Stairway to Heaven‘ oder ‚Highway to Hell‘? – Eine Einschätzung der Europäischen Bankenunion / ‚Stairway to Heaven‘ or ‚Highway to Hell‘? – An Evaluation of the European Banking Union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 147-174, January.
    4. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    5. Haufler, Andreas & Maier, Ulf, 2016. "Regulatory competition in capital standards with selection effects among banks," Discussion Papers in Economics 27700, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Gietl, Daniel & Haufler, Andreas, 2018. "Bonus taxes and international competition for bank managers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 41-60.
    7. Haufler, Andreas & Maier, Ulf, 2019. "Regulatory competition in capital standards: a ‘race to the top’ result," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 180-194.
    8. Maier, Ulf, 2017. "Regulatory Competition In Capital Standards with Selection Effects among Banks," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 7, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Horvath, Balint L. & Huizinga, Harry, 2019. "Regulatory arbitrage and cross-border syndicated loans," Other publications TiSEM 3e62fc2c-fa54-4699-ba52-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Maier, Ulf, 2016. "Multinational banks: Supranational resolution regimes and the importance of capital regulation," Discussion Papers in Economics 29630, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
    13. Maier, Ulf & Haufler, Andreas, 2013. "Regulatory competition in credit markets with capital standards as signals," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79769, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Florian Buck & Eva Schliephake, 2012. "The Regulator's Trade-off: Bank Supervision vs. Minimum Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 3923, CESifo.
    15. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2012. "Political Economy of Banking Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62018, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Kara, Gazi Ishak, 2016. "Systemic risk, international regulation, and the limits of coordination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 192-222.
    17. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2011. "Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(4), pages 983-1018.
    18. Michiel Bijlsma & Wouter Elsenburg & Michiel van Leuvensteijn, 2010. "Four Futures for Finance; A scenario study," CPB Document 211.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    19. McShane, Michael K. & Cox, Larry A. & Butler, Richard J., 2010. "Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 522-532, March.
    20. Engel, Charles, 2016. "Macroprudential policy under high capital mobility: policy implications from an academic perspective," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 162-172.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:91:y:2015:i:292:p:79-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esausea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.