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Influence, Elections, And The Value Of A Vote In The U.S. House Of Representatives

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  • CHRISTOPHER S. P. MAGEE

Abstract

This paper investigates the extent to which interest groups use their campaign contributions to affect election outcomes as opposed to influencing candidate policy choices directly. It also reveals how much value interest groups place on gaining one more favorable vote in the House of Representatives. The empirical estimates suggest that gaining influence dominates helping favored candidates win the election as a means to affect defense spending policies. Political action committees differ in interesting ways, however, with the more ideological peace groups placing greater emphasis on changing electoral outcomes than do investor lobbies representing the defense industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher S. P. Magee, 2007. "Influence, Elections, And The Value Of A Vote In The U.S. House Of Representatives," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 289-315, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:289-315
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00321.x
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    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, July.
    2. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ganesh Manjhi & Meeta Keswani Mehra, 2019. "A Dynamic Analysis of Special Interest Politics and Electoral Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 142-164, March.
    2. Manjhi, Ganesh & Mehra, Meeta Keswani, 2017. "Dynamics of the Economics of Special Interest Politics," Working Papers 17/206, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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