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Determinants of Corporate Governance in the Italian Financial Market

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  • Emilio Barucci
  • Jury Falini

Abstract

We evaluate the determinants of corporate governance of companies listed at the Italian Stock Exchange. We consider ownership structure, balance sheet data, company performance and some qualitative features as determinants. We evaluate the convergence of Italian companies’ governance towards a system with effective governance mechanisms. Our analysis shows definitely that companies with a large shareholder and/or minority blockholders controlling a large stake and companies belonging to a pyramidal group or controlled by a shareholders’ coalition are characterized by a poor governance/shareholders’ protection standard. Institutional investors play a positive role.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilio Barucci & Jury Falini, 2005. "Determinants of Corporate Governance in the Italian Financial Market," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 34(3), pages 371-405, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecnote:v:34:y:2005:i:3:p:371-405
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0391-5026.2005.00155.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
    2. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
    4. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin & Renneboog, Luc, 2001. "Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 209-248, July.
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    2. Thi-Minh-Ngoc Luu & Phuong Mai Nguyen & Huy Hung Ta, 2024. "Revisiting the Corporate Governance–Firm Performance Nexus in Vietnam: Does Capital Structure Really Matter?," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 17(2), pages 182-201, December.
    3. Cristina Cersosimo, 2023. "The determinants of board size in Italian State-owned enterprises operating in water industry," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 50(2), pages 169-182, June.
    4. Irina I. Smotritskaya & Nadezhda D. Frolova, 2021. "The corporate governance quality and market capitalization of Russian companies: An empirical analysis," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 12(4), pages 2-15, September.
    5. Mejbel Al-Saidi, 2021. "Corporate Governance Disclosure and Ownership Concentration in Non-Financial Listed Firms in Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE)," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(1), pages 1-1, January.
    6. Pietro Fera & Rosa Vinciguerra, 2022. "Minorities? Representativeness on the Board and their Effect on the Level of Compliance with the Italian RPTs Regulation," FINANCIAL REPORTING, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2022(2), pages 57-88.
    7. Falcone, Pasquale Marcello & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Sica, Edgardo, 2018. "Greening of the financial system and fuelling a sustainability transition," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 23-37.
    8. Barbara, Petracci, 2011. "Trading when you cannot trade: Blackout periods in Italian firms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 196-204, September.
    9. Nicola Moscariello & Michele Pizzo & Dmytro Govorun & Alexander Kostyuk, 2019. "Independent minority directors and firm value in a principal–principal agency setting: evidence from Italy," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(1), pages 165-194, March.

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