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What Should Banks Really Do?: Comment

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  • GEORGE S. BERGER

Abstract

In the July 1992 Contemporary Policy Issues edition, Lawrence J. White (1992) argues that the inherently unstable character of the banking system requires that depositors be protected by various types of government intervention. The comment here outlines the opposite argument: government intervention destabilizes an inherently stable banking system. A framework developed in the comment provides the basis for criticizing White's general approach and policy proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • George S. Berger, 1993. "What Should Banks Really Do?: Comment," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 11(4), pages 107-110, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:11:y:1993:i:4:p:107-110
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1993.tb00405.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence J. White, 1992. "What Should Banks Really Do?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 10(3), pages 104-112, July.
    2. George A. Selgin, 1989. "Legal Restrictions, Financial Weakening, and the Lender of Last Resort," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(2), pages 429-469, Fall.
    3. Gorton, Gary & Mullineaux, Donald J, 1987. "The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 457-468, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence J. White, 1993. "What Should Banks Really Do?: Reply," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 11(4), pages 111-113, October.

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