False prosperity: Rethinking government support for farmers’ cooperatives in China

The rapid development of farmers’ cooperatives in rural China cannot be separated from government support. To ensure the growth of farmers’ cooperatives, the Chinese government uses it as a key performance indicator for its local institutions. Superficially, rural China's cooperative population and membership size witnessed rapid growth during the first decade after the Farmers’ Specialized Cooperatives Law was enacted in 2007; however, such government intervention also leads to non‐standard phenomena due to market distortion. Using nationally representative survey data from 504 cooperatives in Jiangsu, Jilin, and Sichuan provinces, this paper provides a reliable estimate of the “shell cooperative” rate around 2014. The empirical study sheds further light on the role of government during the period of rapid but chaotic growth by a subset containing 241 marketing cooperatives. Results show that direct administrative intervention leads to the emergence of many shell cooperatives (approximately 37%). Further study also confirms that task‐oriented policy support is only positively associated with the nominal coverage ratio but has no significant relationship with cooperatives’ function. This study provides new insights into the formation of shell cooperatives and suggests that direct administrative intervention may not be a good strategy for promoting the sustainable development of farmers’ cooperatives.