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Une évaluation des effets de la privatisation sur l’accès aux ressources en eau dans les pays en développement

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  • Luisa Sciandra

Abstract

Resume**: Dans la plupart des pays en développement, la relative rareté de l’eau s’accompagne d’une détérioration continue de sa qualité. L’article propose quelques réflexions sur l’implication du secteur privé dans la gestion de l’approvisionnement en eau dans les pays en développement. L’analyse se centre principalement sur les implications sociales et les limites afin de vérifier si la privatisation contribue à l’élargissement de l’accès à l’eau. A cette fin, plusieurs exemples de cas sont présentés qui étayent les conclusions présentées dans la dernière section de l’article.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Sciandra, 2005. "Une évaluation des effets de la privatisation sur l’accès aux ressources en eau dans les pays en développement," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 233-255, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:76:y:2005:i:2:p:233-255
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1370-4788.2005.00277.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabienne Fecher & Benoît Lévesque, 2008. "The Public Sector And The Social Economy In The Annals (1975–2007): Towards A New Paradigm," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 679-727, September.

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